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Whistleblower Protection

Amnesty programme

A time-limited offer by a company promising employees reduced or waived employment-law sanctions during an internal investigation if they voluntarily disclose their own misconduct fully and truthfully.

An amnesty programme – sometimes called an internal leniency or self-disclosure programme – is a voluntary compliance instrument. Within a clearly defined window, the company invites employees to disclose their own involvement in legal or policy violations and, in return, promises to refrain from specific sanctions: usually dismissal, formal warnings and internal claims for damages. The purpose is to obtain reliable information quickly during an internal investigation, establish the full facts and stop the misconduct. The instrument became widely known through large corporate investigations. German law provides no statutory basis for it; it rests entirely on the employer's freedom to shape its own contractual and disciplinary decisions.

The reach of such a promise is limited: a company can only waive what belongs to it. It cannot rule out criminal prosecution – public prosecutors investigate offences subject to mandatory prosecution regardless of the company's wishes – nor can it stop regulatory or administrative-fine proceedings. Genuine statutory amnesty exists only in specific areas, such as the self-disclosure that removes criminal liability for tax evasion (section 371 of the German Fiscal Code, AO) or the antitrust leniency programme (sections 81h et seq. of the German Competition Act, GWB). An internal programme does not replace these regimes; it operates alongside them. The privilege against self-incrimination also remains intact: employees must answer questions about their own area of responsibility, but they cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves criminally, and whether such statements may later be used in criminal proceedings remains legally contested.

In practice, the boundary with whistleblower protection matters. The German Whistleblower Protection Act (HinSchG) shields reporting persons from retaliation (section 36 HinSchG), but it does not release them from responsibility for their own wrongdoing. A person who discloses their own involvement may simultaneously qualify as a reporting person; the employer must then show that any adverse measure is based on that person's own violation and not on the report, because section 36(2) HinSchG presumes detriment following a report to be retaliation. A robust amnesty programme therefore needs written conditions applied equally to everyone: a defined window, a duty of complete disclosure and cooperation, explicit exclusions (for instance for instigators or top management) and GDPR-compliant documentation. Where the programme is embedded in a compliance policy, works council co-determination rights must be examined in advance.

Legal Basis

No express statutory basis; relevant limits and references: section 36 HinSchG (prohibition of retaliation, reversal of the burden of proof), section 8 HinSchG (confidentiality requirement), sections 30 and 130 OWiG (corporate fines, breach of supervisory duties), section 371 AO (self-disclosure in tax matters), sections 81h et seq. GWB (antitrust leniency), Art. 5 and 6 GDPR, section 87 BetrVG (works council co-determination)

Practical Example

After a report about manipulated inspection records, an automotive supplier launches an internal investigation and finds indications that the practice may extend across several sites. The compliance function proposes a six-week amnesty programme to the management board: anyone who comes forward to the internal reporting office within that period, gives a complete account and cooperates with the investigation receives a written assurance that the company will not terminate their employment or pursue recourse claims; employees who ordered the manipulation and cases of personal enrichment are excluded. The works council is involved, the assurances are worded identically for every participant, and the statements are documented for a defined purpose with restricted access. Eleven employees come forward, allowing the company to clarify the facts within the three-month feedback deadline, correct its processes and demonstrate its willingness to cooperate to the authority.

FAQ

No. A company can only waive its own employment-law and civil-law measures, such as dismissal, formal warnings or claims for damages. Criminal prosecution is decided solely by the public prosecutor, who investigates offences subject to mandatory prosecution ex officio. Exemption from punishment exists only where a statute expressly provides for it, as with self-disclosure under section 371 AO.
The two instruments complement each other but are not the same. The HinSchG protects reporting persons from retaliation, yet it does not exempt them from responsibility for their own misconduct. Because section 36(2) HinSchG presumes that detriment suffered after a report is retaliation, the company should document carefully what any measure is actually based on.
It needs a clearly limited time window, a requirement of complete and truthful disclosure, active cooperation with the investigation and explicitly named exclusions – for instance instigators, top management or cases of personal enrichment. The assurances should be in writing, identical for everyone and legally binding. Data protection, confidentiality and any works council co-determination rights should be clarified beforehand.

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